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In “Financial Strategies for Nation Building”, Professor Zhiwu Chen offered us two 
interesting observations and one brave thesis. The first observation is that no government 
lasted for more than three hundred years in imperial China. What can be done to prevent 
such a cycle of regime change from happening again in modern day China? This is the 
question that Chen set out to answer in the paper. And the answer is, according to 
Professor Chen, is public debt. To justify the answer, Chen offered his second observation: 
governments in imperial China resorted either taxes or inflation, but not public debt to 
finance government spending. Chen argued that, when a government faces a large 
negative fiscal shock, using tax or inflation to finance “were politically and socially 
dangerous”, whereas using debt financing would have helped “spread the temporary high 
burden over a period of 30 to 80 years”. Contrasting with the experience of imperial 
China, Chen noted that, since 1982, China has a growing national debt on the one hand 
and an increasingly strong economy on the other. Borrowing from MacDonald (2003), 
Chen noted further that countries deep in debt back in 1600 tend to be developed 
economies today. Chen asserted that making use of public debt can “reduce the pressure 
for the national treasury to save so the country can invest more”, and can allow the 
government to “covert future fiscal revenues into capital of today”. Thus, the thesis from 
Professor Chen is: public debt helps the nation grow strong.   
 
Chen’s thesis offers a refreshing perspective to examine the aforementioned two 
seemingly unrelated phenomena. It was a pleasure and an inspiration for me to read his 
article and to contemplate the intriguing observations Professor Chen has brought 
forward.  
 
Chen pointed out three advantages of debt over tax in meeting government 
spending: spreading the tax burden over time, capitalizing on future tax revenues, and 
reducing the precautionary need for saving for the government. According to Chen, the 
first one is crucial for a regime to survive a large spending shock; the latter two paves the 
way for the nation to succeed. Given these great advantages of debt over tax, there is a 
natural question of why generations after generations of governments in imperial China 
failed to recognize these advantages, but resorted to debt that ultimately led to their own 
downfall. While Professor Chen did not elaborate much on this question, two 
explanations are possible. The first possible explanation is that debt may not enjoy as a 
great advantage as described. After all, debt postpones tax, and there may be little 
difference between the two per ricardian equivalence. Of course, many factors pertinent 
to imperial China may render the equivalence invalid. Professor Chen can make his thesis 
more convincing by pinpointing some of these factors.   
 
The second possible explanation is that governments in imperial China did not rely 
on public debt because they were not able to. One factor Professor Chen may want to 
consider is the possibility of government default on public debt. If there exists a dynastic cycle, as Professor Chen noted in the case of imperial China, then private agents may not 
even want to lend money to the regime when a regime is coming to an end. If we add the 
default factor to Chen’s thesis, multiple equilibria become possible. Private agents either 
lend to the government and, by saving the day, the debt is eventually repaid; or do not 
lend to the government, in which case the government will collapse, not able to repay any 
debt should it have borrowed any. In other words, the presence of the dynastic cycle may 
have prevented public debt from being adopted.   
 
In this case of equilibrium multiplicity, it is natural to further ask: which 
equilibrium is more likely to emerge in the context of imperial China? I think Professor 
Chen can enrich his thesis by discussing the existing literature related to the dynastic 
cycle in imperial China, which has attributed the cycle to factors other than the absence 
of public debt.   
 
Of course, the discussion earlier assumes that the next regime will not recognize the 
public debt raised by the previous one. I suppose that this is indeed the case for imperial 
China. However, this is not true for public debt in a modern society. Why there is such a 
difference is another interesting issue to be addressed to supplement Professor Chen’s 
thesis.  
 
Leaving aside how spending should be financed, Professor Chen also suggested: 
“spend as much as possible at the present in order to develop the economy and increase 
future wealthgenerating potential”. I believe Professor Chen can make his statement more 
precise if he could elaborate on why, in his view, government spending is more preferable 
to private spending. These issues are in fact related to his reading of China’s economic 
success during the last three decades, which he attributed to public debt raised by the 
Chinese government, whereas most students of China’s economy would probably have 
attributed to the withdraw of the government’s role in the economy.   
 
Finally, I find the paper to be more relevant for the survival of a dynastic regime 
than for the building of a nation. Although the two issues may be related, they are not the 
same. After all, for an extended period of human history, China remained a leading 
civilization and the largest economy in the world, with the dynastic cycle but without 
relying upon any public debt.   